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CENTRE FOR HEALTH ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
The Discussion Paper (DP) Series was established in 1984 to make research available quickly  to a broad 
readership drawn from the academic community, professional health care staff and policy makers, both 
within the UK and internationally.   Material published in DP form ranges from work in progress, to 
edited versions of completed project reports, from papers intended ultimately for journal publication, to 
those which seek to stimulate immediate debate.  Hence the variation in length and complexity of DPs. 
 
In the past, DPs have been subject to a minimum of editorial revision, it being principally seen as the 
responsibility of individual authors to ensure that appropriate standards were met.  Since June 1996, a 
more formal system of internal peer-review has been introduced  to consolidate the high levels of quality 
that have been achieved in the past.  That system involves the refereeing of DPs in draft form, with any 
recommended revisions being verified independently by a senior member of staff. 
 
DPs are not a substitute for publication in peer-reviewed journals.   It is to be hoped that journal editors 
will recognise the nature of the DP series, and accept that this does not compromise the status of those 
papers published by the Centre which may later be submitted for consideration in more formal 
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The provision of quantitative information has been given a key role in securing good 
performance in the new NHS.  A new National Performance Framework has been proposed 
encompassing a number of dimensions of performance.  Whilst this approach to managing 
the  NHS is welcomed, it is essential to understand the strengths and limitations intrinsic to 
the use of performance indicators for this purpose.  In particular, complex  behavioural 
consequences may arise in response to the collection and dissemination of performance data, 
some of which may be unintended, potentially dysfunctional and damaging for the NHS.  
Results from a recent study on the performance of NHS Trusts are used to illustrate the sort 
of unintended side-effects which occur within the current system and which may in principle 
be replicated in the new system in future.  Whilst the possibility of such consequences does 
not invalidate the potential of the new Performance Framework to secure the desired changes 
in the NHS, it does suggest that careful attention needs to be paid to the assessment of 
unanticipated side-effects. 
 The NHS Performance Framework: Taking Account of Economic Behaviour 
  4
(I)   INTRODUCTION 
 
The publication of the 1997 White Paper, ''The New NHS: modern, dependable'' (and its Scottish 
and Welsh equivalents) signal a fundamental change in the way that the NHS is to be managed 
(Department of Health 1997).  The new NHS is to be “based on partnership and driven by 
performance''.  The government's 'third way' is neither an attempt to return to the centralised 
command and control systems of the 1970s, nor a commitment to retaining the competitive 
internal market system of the 1990s.  The stated intention is to build upon the strengths of each, 
creating a more collaborative service with economic relationships based on partnership and co-
operation.   Whereas the internal market reforms gave competition the central role in securing 
performance, the key instrument for managing the NHS in the future will be the provision of 
quantitative information, in the form of a new National Performance Framework.  Proposals for 
the nature and content of the Framework were issued for consultation in January 1988, providing 
more detail on the broad intentions outlined in the White Paper (NHS Executive 1998). 
 
In general, the new approach to managing the NHS is to be welcomed.  However, in developing 
the Performance Framework, it is essential to have a proper understanding of the strengths and 
limitations intrinsic to the use of performance indicators for securing management control in the 
NHS.   A key issue which has so far been largely ignored in the White Paper and the consultation 
document is the impact of performance indicators on behaviour.  If it is to have any effect, 
publication of performance data must lead to changes in behaviour of NHS organisations and 
staff.   Yet there is little appreciation in the official documents of the complex behavioural 
consequences that may arise as a result of the collection and dissemination of performance data.   
In addition to having the predicted impact on behaviour, the potential exists for performance 
management systems to produce unintended and possibly dysfunctional consequences which 
may be damaging to the NHS.   
 
This paper summarises the theoretical issues and the results of previous research in this topic.   It 
then uses some of the findings from a recently completed study to illustrate the sort of 
unintended side-effects that occur within the current system of performance management which 
may in principle be replicated in the new system in future.  We conclude that careful attention 
needs to be paid to the potential for unanticipated side-effects.  The possibility of such 
consequences does not invalidate the principle of seeking to develop a workable Performance 
Framework.   However it does suggest that much more attention than is evident in the 
consultation document must be directed at how the proposed data are to be disseminated and 
used within the NHS.  
 
The paper is arranged as follows.  The next section provides an overview of the new 
performance framework as set out in the White Paper. Section III sets out a theoretical model of 
the performance measurement process and Section IV summarises the key research findings 
from attempts to introduce comparable measurement schemes in the public sector.  This is 
followed by a brief outline of the aims and methodology of the Department of Health Funded 
study in the information used to assess NHS Trusts. Section VI summarises some of the findings 
of this study relating to the unintended and dysfunctional outcomes of performance indicators 
and makes some suggestions for a range of strategies to offset some of the unanticipated 
consequences described. Finally, in Section VII the paper outlines a number of policy 
recommendations relating to the future development and implementation of the national 





(II)  THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK 
 
The White Paper and the consultation document outline the six key areas of performance on 
which the National Framework will focus: 
 
•  Health improvement  
 
The aim of improving the general health of the population. 
 
•  Fair access 
 
Fair access to health services according to need irrespective of geography, class, ethnicity, age 
or sex. 
 
•  Effective delivery of appropriate healthcare   
 
The aim of providing effective, appropriate and timely health care which meets agreed 
standards. 
 
•  Efficiency 
 
The use of NHS resources to achieve best value for money. 
 
•  Patient/carer experience 
 
The way in which patients and carers view the quality of treatment and care that they receive.  
 
•  Health outcomes of NHS care 
 
Assessing the direct contribution of NHS care to improvements in overall health. 
 
Targets for progress against these six areas are to be built into: the performance agreements 
between NHS Executive Regional Offices and Health Authorities; local Health Improvement 
Programmes; accountability agreements between Primary Care Groups and Health Authorities; 
and the agreements between Primary Care Groups and Trusts.  The measures used to assess each 
of these dimensions will be constructed in the light of responses to the consultation document.  It 
is expected that the Performance Framework will replace the Purchaser Efficiency Index in 1999. 
The proposals for assessing and managing the performance  of the NHS are to be welcomed on a 
number of grounds.  Specifically,  they represent an improvement on existing arrangements in 
the following areas: 
 
•  Focus on the health aspects of performance rather than only on finance and activity issues 
 
•  Focus on equity issues 
•  Focus on patient experience The NHS Performance Framework: Taking Account of Economic Behaviour 
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•  Acknowledge the contribution of other agencies besides the NHS to health outcomes 
 
•  Focus on the population or client group rather than solely on providers 
 
•  Focus on the local as well as the national level 
 
More generally, the increased emphasis to be placed upon performance measurement in the NHS 
is to be welcomed.   Excessive reliance on markets to secure improvements in health services is 
misguided.  Successful performance management is likely to require a far more sensitive set of 
instruments than a competitive market, and a good system of performance measurement must 
form an essential component of that set. 
 





(III)  THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
 
It is probably simplest to think of the performance measurement approach as one of feedback.  
Figure 1 outlines a very simple model encapsulating the essence of this process.  Certain 
aspects of the organisation are measured.  These are analysed and interpreted in the light of 
environmental influences and organisational objectives.  Finally, some sort of action results 




















Many of the consequences of this system of feedback are likely to be intended and helpful.   
For example, publication of data relating to waiting times for elective surgery, in association 
with substantial political attention to the issue, has undoubtedly contributed towards an 
improvement in certain aspects of waiting within the NHS.  Less certainty however, can be 
attached to the broader consequences of such measurement.  For example, at various times it 
has been claimed that the emphasis on very long waits has led to increased emphasis within 
NHS Trusts on relatively minor procedures at the expense of more urgent surgery, and that 
the emphasis on elective surgery has resulted in the diversion of resources from activities for 
which equivalent performance measures do not exist. 
 
Thus the net effect of any single performance measure (or set of measures) on the NHS as a 
whole may be quite complex to evaluate.  In particular, it is clearly important to look well 
beyond any improvements in the measure itself in order to determine whether publication of 
the measure is on balance beneficial.  In this section we therefore summarise a variety of 
ways in which unintended side-effects can arise from performance management systems.  















Any measurement system will to some extent be partial.  If it is intended to affect the 
behaviour of managers, clinicians and other workers, it will require incentives to pay 
increased attention to the measured, and therefore conversely less attention to the 
unmeasured.  This may induce tunnel vision, or the neglect of unmeasured aspects of activity.  
 
A slightly different danger is that of fragmentation.  Many outcomes from health care depend 
on the collaboration of a variety of other organisations, both within and outside the NHS.  
The eventual outcome therefore depends on the joint efforts of these agencies.  It may be 
quite challenging to devise measurement schemes which can capture the contribution of each 
agency to outcome, and there is a danger of sub-optimisation, in the sense that agencies are 
driven towards pursuing their own performance criteria with little regard for joint outcomes. 
 
Almost all measures are short term in their perspective.  Yet current measures may reflect the 
outcome of years’ of health care activity, and therefore cannot be attributed solely to current 
activity.  And current activity may affect future outcomes, which are not captured in current 
performance measures.  Special attention will therefore have to be given to activities which 
have long term health outcomes. 
 
Although there may be universal agreement that a particular phenomenon is an important 
aspect of NHS performance, there may be numerous instruments for capturing the 
phenomenon of interest.  For example, existing measures of waiting time choose to focus on 
exceptionally long waits, but there is no reason why this particular aspect of waiting should 
necessarily be addressed.  Yet the choice of one instrument in preference to another may have 
profound implications for organisational behaviour. There is a danger of encouraging 
measure fixation if managers pursue strategies which enhance their success in terms of the 
reported measure, rather than focusing on the underlying objective. 
 
It must be remembered that the collection of many indicators of performance will rely on the 
co-operation of front line NHS staff.  If their rewards are to any extent dependent on the data 
they report, there is of course a constant danger of misrepresentation in one form or another. 
 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that health care is a dynamic, ever-changing activity, 
and that technologies and needs change very quickly.  There is therefore a danger of 
ossification, and any performance measurement scheme therefore needs to be constantly 




Health care performance data are often immensely difficult to interpret.  Many measures 
reflect the outcome of a complex interaction of factors, such as environment and deprivation, 
which may have a profound impact on the measure which is outside the control of the NHS.  
Careful analysis may therefore be required to ensure that the contribution of the NHS to the 
chosen performance measures is correctly identified.  In practice, the analysis of performance 







The impact of a performance measurement scheme will depend on the rewards, punishments 
and incentives implicit in its design.  At one extreme, if no appropriate incentives are put in 
place, the data produced may be largely ignored and produce no meaningful action.  At the 
other extreme, the livelihood of managers and health care professionals may depend crucially 
on reported measures, leading to the potential for excessive attention to reported performance 
(as opposed to patient outcome) and misrepresentation.   
 
Furthermore, certain types of measure may be susceptible to gaming on the part of health 
care professionals.  This phenomenon was endemic to the Soviet Union, where year on year 
improvement was the usual performance measure.  Managers had little incentive to achieve 
good results in the current year because in all probability their future targets would be based 
on the new level of attainment, leading to the need for increased effort in the future. 
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(IV)  PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSES 
 
This section summarises the limited amount of research evidence available in relation to the 
behavioural impact of performance data publication.  A more detailed account can be found 
in Nutley and Smith (1998).   
 
Publication of performance data has little purpose if it is not to have some impact on the 
behaviour of the health care organisation.  The nature of the feedback that organisations 
receive from interested parties following publication is therefore a key influence on 
subsequent managerial and clinical actions.  Such feedback might be formal, as in the case of 
the Peer Review Organisations advocated by the US Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA), which are intended to offer "non-punitive" interpretation of results.  Or the feedback 
might be more haphazard and informal, as for example in the Patient's Charter initiative.  
Here data are exposed in the public arena, from which a variety of political pressures might 
emerge.  Indeed the implications of feedback may be very different depending on whether or 
not data are made public.  For example, Conway et al (1995) describe a feedback system in 
Maine in which data are shared in confidence with clinicians in order to retain their support 
for the project. 
 
As noted above, intrinsic to the feedback process is the system of punishments and rewards 
attached to the performance measurement scheme.  These are likely to be largely implicit and 
difficult to define, but may nevertheless be of immense importance.  In concrete terms, 
performance rankings might affect budgets, bonuses and job security, while less tangibly they 
are likely to influence staff morale and recruitment.  In the US a surgeon's poor league table 
rating might lead to loss of livelihood.  Moreover, a potential problem in the feedback 
process is the existence of contradictory messages.  For example, the US Health Quality 
Improvement Initiative emphasises consensus, collaboration and non-antagonistic feedback.  
Yet Nash (1995) points out that HCFA are also basing accreditation and payment decisions 
on performance data, a conflict which may undermine many of the benefits of feedback. 
 
While undoubtedly of central importance, the nature of the feedback process and the 
associated reward structure are intrinsically difficult to study, and there has been a notable 
lack of research on the impact of performance publication within the health care sector 
(Rosenthal and Harper 1994, Nash 1995).
   Any user of health care performance data is likely 
to need supporting material to help interpret the results.  This might take the form of 
supplementary data or of expert help. For example, Goldman and Thomas (1994) describe 
how hospital specific mortality rates provided a screening tool which led onto a focused 
medical records review in outlier providers; Nelson et al (1995) report the use of supporting 
data in the form of “instrument panels”; Finlan and Zibrat (1994) describe the impact on 
clinical practice in one hospital of comparative data provided by the US Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Health Care Organizations; and Moller et al (1994) describe how a 
consortium of providers have set up a study group to examine outcome measures in 
paediatric cardiac care.  However, there has in general been little examination of the 
mechanism for feeding information back to hospitals and clinicians.  Most schemes appear to 
rely on a vague hope that providers will “do something” in response to the data.  Yet 
evidence from the broader UK public sector suggests that - in the absence of formal feedback 
procedures - little change may occur. 





One of the key concerns about many performance measurement systems, and particularly 
report cards, is that they are backward looking, judgmental and poor motivational devices.  
Greene and Wintfeld (1996) conclude that by the time the data are published, users of the 
report cards can have little confidence that the ratings are still applicable.  As a response to 
these concerns, some authors like to think of performance indicators in terms of the 
instrument panel of an aircraft or car (Jackson 1995, Meekings 1995).  The focus then is on 
providing real time, on-line monitoring which is action oriented.  Although Nelson et al 
(1995) illustrate the instrument panel concept by reporting on work in the Dartmouth- 
Hitchcock (US) health care system, it is not generally clear how these principles can be 
translated to the health care setting. 
 
More generally, few studies have sought to evaluate in any comprehensive way the 
behavioural ramifications of publication.  The obvious means of judging the impact of a 
performance measurement scheme is by examining its apparent impact on performance.   
Such exercises may however be tautological, in the sense that the yardsticks used to evaluate 
the scheme may be precisely the same potentially imperfect instruments of measurement used 
in the scheme itself, which may be subject to the problems of partiality, distortion and 
incompleteness we have noted above.  Thus, the previous UK Government proclaimed the 
success of the Patient's Charter by citing improvements in the length of time patients wait for 
inpatient admission, the Charter's prime performance measure (UK Government 1995).  Yet 
there are many other aspects of NHS health care on which the Charter is silent, but which 
may have been adversely affected by the emphasis on waiting times.   
 
In the same way, Chassin, Hannan and DeBuono (1996) cite a notable decline in risk-
adjusted mortality associated with the New York report card scheme.  However, Greene and 
Wintfeld (1996) argue that the phenomenon may be more a function of an increase in the 
reporting of risk factors than a real improvement in surgical outcomes.  And Ghali et al  
(1997) note that similar improvements in risk-adjusted mortality were found in 
Massachusetts, which did not publish mortality data.  Naive examination of apparent 
improvements in reported performance is therefore inadequate, and  much more complete 
evaluation, seeking to identify any side effects of performance publication is needed.  In this 
context, Smith (1993) examined the impact on maternity managers of a single, well-
established performance measure - the perinatal mortality rate.  He identified seven 
potentially dysfunctional consequences of publication of these data, and found compelling 
evidence that some had indeed materialised.  For example: managers were concentrating on 
perinatal mortality at the expense of other dimensions of performance; maternity units were 
paying less attention than previously to the effects their actions might have on other parts of 
the health service; long term outcomes were being given less attention than hitherto; and 
there was some suggestion that doctors’ reporting of the timing of mortality may have been 
influenced by the definition of perinatal mortality (which excludes the first 28 weeks of 
pregnancy). 
 
Thus the feedback phase of the performance measurement process clearly requires more 
attention.  As Stewart (1984) points out for the broader public sector, in examining the 
accountability relationship it is important to consider both the giving of an account (the 
publication of performance data) and the mechanisms available to hold organisations to The NHS Performance Framework: Taking Account of Economic Behaviour 
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account.  The accounts provided to stakeholders within health care systems need to meet their 
varied interests and be communicated in a language which makes sense to them.  There is 
then a need for mechanisms with which to hold service providers to account.  The 
strengthened role of external audit bodies is one means of achieving the latter.  Where a 
market exists for health care services, it may be possible for patients and purchasers to vote 
with their feet and choose providers on the basis of reported performance.  However within a 
publicly provided system, there is also a clear need for transparent democratic processes for 
holding providers to account. 
 
In summary, whatever the system of health care, simply reporting performance is unlikely to 
be sufficient to secure improvements. 
 





(V)   AIMS AND METHODS OF STUDY 
 
The aim of the research  was to investigate the types of information used to assess the 
performance of NHS Trusts.  A major element in the research was the exploration of  the 
kinds of 'soft' or informal information used alongside more formal measures of performance.  
The results of this will be reported elsewhere.  However, we also sought to identify any 
unintended and dysfunctional behavioural consequences of current performance measures.   
Although the study was based on experiences with the current set of performance measures, it 
is of relevance to the new framework for two reasons.  First, many of the indicators proposed 
will be the same as (or very similar to) those used currently (eg waiting times); second, the 
principles relating to behavioural responses will apply to a range of measures which have 
characteristics similar to those considered, even if the specific measures differ. 
 
The research was based on case-studies of eight Trusts.  Two NHS Executive Regional 
Offices  were approached and senior staff responsible for provider finance and performance 
were asked to nominate four hospitals exhibiting what they considered to be a wide range of 
performance.  We limited the choice to District General Hospitals, in order to make our 
sample as homogenous as possible.    The Chief Executive of each of the selected Trusts was 
contacted and invited to participate in the research.  
    
Within each Trust semi-structured interviews were undertaken with the Chief Executive, the 
Medical Director, a Nurse Manager and a Junior Doctor. 
1  One Junior Doctor did not attend 
for the interview, so we undertook a total of 31 interviews within Trusts.   In addition, we 
interviewed the Finance Director of the local Health Authority for each Trust (the Trust’s 
main purchaser).  We asked the finance director to include any other relevant staff in the 
interviews and in half the cases additional people attended, mainly from a health 
development or commissioning background.   At the Regional Offices, we interviewed staff 
responsible for provider finance and performance.   These external organisations added a 





                                                 
1   One of the aims of the study was to investigate the views of people at different levels in the 
organisation on how their performance was judged and how they felt they were held to account.  
However, the results of this are not discussed further in this paper but will be reported elsewhere in 
the future.  We also gathered views of a sample of  GP fundholders, but again, these are not discussed 
in this paper. The NHS Performance Framework: Taking Account of Economic Behaviour 
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(VI) THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
Following Smith (1995), we report the findings on unintended consequences of performance 
indicator schemes under the following headings: 
 
Tunnel vision: Concentration on areas that are included in the performance indicator scheme, 
to the exclusion of other important areas. 
 
Sub-optimisation: The pursuit of narrow local objectives by managers, at the expense of the 
objectives of the organisation as a whole. 
 
Myopia: Concentration on short term issues, to the exclusion of long term criteria that may 
only show up in performance measures in many years' time.   
 
Misrepresentation: The deliberate manipulation of data including 'creative' accounting and 
fraud so that reported behaviour differs from actual behaviour. 
 
Gaming: Altering behaviour so as to obtain strategic advantage. 
 
We consider these below in turn, taking into account the range of views received from 




There was clear recognition by staff at all levels that current indicators did not give a 
'rounded' view of the performance of a Trust and that their specific focus often diverted 
attention from equally legitimate (but unmeasured) aspects of Trust performance:  
 
''If you set 10 performance indicators what this will do is encourage the Trust to 
perform on these 10 and not be too bothered about anything else'' (Health Authority 
Finance Director). 
 
''It (the current system of performance indicators) cannot possibly give a rounded 
view because they are only a handful relative to the whole spectrum that goes on in a 
Trust''  (Trust Medical Director) 
 
''There is no point in only trying to manage what you can measure. You have to be 
imaginative about other things and work out ways of trying to assess them'' (Trust 
Chief Executive) 
 
The current priority given to waiting times targets was frequently cited as diverting attention 
and resources away from other important spheres of Trust performance.  Indeed it is apparent 
that a  vast amount of effort and resources are devoted by Health Authorities and Trusts to 
ensuring they meet the targets and some clearly feel it is money which they would prefer to 
spend elsewhere.   In some cases, those responsible for ensuring the target is met will use a 
range of tactics to ensure they achieve the correct results, sometimes at the expense of other 
priorities.   





Examples of both the time and effort involved and the sort of tactics employed at Trusts to 
ensure targets are met included: 
 
•  a senior person in one Health Authority spends the majority of their time chasing the Trust 
about individual patients on the waiting list who have to be treated in order to avoid a 
breach of the standards   
•  treating all the cataract patients on the list in order to reduce the numbers at a relatively 
modest cost, whilst leaving people requiring more expensive operations on the list  
•  removing long waiters, regardless of their medical condition 
•  putting people on the "pending list" (a waiting list for the waiting list) rather than on the 
official waiting list 
•  the employment of 'hello nurses' in A and E Departments in order to ensure the 5 minute 
waiting time target is met 
 
In such cases, staff feel they have been pressured to "manage the waiting lists rather than the 
patients" and that changes have been made "not to improve the quality of care but to improve 
our ratings" (Trust Medical Director). 
 
The  propensity for tunnel vision may be associated with the particular management style of a 
Trust: 
 
''We are not performance indicator driven but I know that you could go to others and 
it would all be about performance indicators. The Trust we are merging with couldn't 
be more different in that respect. They would say.......if you cannot graph it or put a 
number to it, it doesn’t exist''  
 
Clearly, the introduction of a wider range of measures, including clinical indicators will 
offset to some extent the common complaint that the current system leads managers to focus 
only on the process orientated measures, at the expense of more important things which may 
not be measured (or measurable). 
 
The lack of measures relating to outcomes, compared with the number focusing on  process 
and activity, was mentioned frequently in our study.  The piloting of clinical indicators and 
the proposals for the national performance framework were therefore welcomed by most 
staff.  However, difficulties in finding good comparators and methods for dealing with case-
mix were seen as potential problem areas.  Given the perceived  limitations, some clinicians 
advocated that clinical outcome measures should be supplemented by process measures of 
clinical activity such as the recording of “near misses”.  The use of evidence based guidelines 
and “clinical pathways” were also thought to be important in augmenting outcome measures. 
 
Adding new measures may therefore reduce the extent to which people focus only on 
demonstrating success on a small number of measures, but too many measures may also 
induce dysfunctional consequences, particularly  if it becomes  a 'juggling' act to try to focus 
on them all.   For example, when asked about the new proposals for performance 
management, one Health Authority Finance Director reported that even without the addition The NHS Performance Framework: Taking Account of Economic Behaviour 
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of the new indicators he felt there were too many.  No-one could be expected to do well on 
them all and thus it would result in a considerable waste of time and effort as people tried to 




Sub-optimisation can occur where there is a lack of congruence between personal incentives 
and the global objectives of the organisation.  This was one of the key aspects of performance 
which we addressed in our study and we will be reporting on this in detail elsewhere in 
future.   However, in brief,  we found that although each Trust had corporate objectives, these 
objectives were not always aligned with the specific incentive structures for different staff 
within the organisation.   In particular, it was clear that it was often difficult to align the Trust 
financial objectives with specific clinical priorities.  In order to address this problem, all of 
the Trusts were attempting to actively engage medical staff within the management process to 
facilitate clinical 'ownership' of the major strategic financial and administrative issues facing 
the organisation. This was thought by some respondents to be a particularly difficult task 
when a Trust was in a serious financial position and clinicians were expected to co-operate in 
service reductions:   
 
''The Trust objectives as a whole are business type objectives. What I'm trying to do 
now is get enough information to turn them into more clinical objectives... . What I 
want [is for the clinicians] to own the decisions and own the outcomes'' (Trust Chief 
Executive) 
 
''One of the key reasons why this organisation has failed is because the clinical staff, 
junior and senior have largely been disengaged from the management process. So 
part of the work we have been doing to address our financial deficit has not just been 
to take a substantial amount of money out of the cost expenditure it has also been to 
bring clinicians into the heart of the management process.”  (Trust Chief Executive) 
 
Interviews with the junior doctors also revealed a lack of congruence between their own 
personal objectives - which were largely related to getting a good reference for their next job 
- and those of the Trust in general.  Indeed, many of them reported little detailed knowledge 
of the formal performance management system at all:   
 
  “I don’t have much to do with performance indicators.  They don’t impact on my 
  work.  I haven’t seen the [clinical indicators] at all” (Junior Doctor) 
 
Although there were some exceptions where junior doctors did realise they had to see 
patients within a certain length of time in order to comply with Patient’s Charter demands, 
most saw themselves as being distant from the formal systems of performance assessment.  
Another example of sub-optimisation identified by senior staff was the potential for a lack of 
congruence between the incentives or objectives of different agencies responsible for 
provision of health care within a local community.  The most commonly cited example of this 
was ''bed blocking''  which can occur as a result of lack of agreement about responsibilities of 
health and social services. 
 
Aside from trying to promote ownership of objectives by clinical staff by involving them in 





found that setting devolved budgets and undertaking individual performance review or formal 
appraisal schemes were the two main mechanisms for transmitting Trust level objectives 
down to staff at various levels within the organisational hierarchy.  
 
Additionally, some Trusts had used comparisons with clinical services in other Trusts to 
combat professional challenge of corporate objectives: 
 
''We've only been able to break into the professional dominance by challenging such 
things as staffing levels based on benchmarking at other Trusts........ We've also 
maintained a professional nursing support group where senior nurses can express 




There was a general feeling among our respondents that many of the current performance 
indicators are short term in nature and actions taken now may not show up in indicators for 
several years: 
 
''I think short-termism has been a major problem in performance management culture 
of the NHS eg  the fact that there has been until recently the requirement to make 
income and expenditure balance each year.  Now we have failed to do that and we 
have been treated like lepers for doing so.  But when you are going through major 
change any private sector enterprise would not just look at one years results but 
achievements against a five year plan” (Trust Chief Executive)  
 
In fact,  most of the respondents in our sample were fairly optimistic about this - although 
they felt that they were sometimes being pushed to deliver short term targets (e.g. reductions 
in management costs) without a view to the longer term, there was some recognition that 
sometimes the short term picture will be poor but that this was acceptable if it produced a 
better long term outcome.  For example, Regional Office staff recognised that some Trusts 
had performed poorly in terms of their financial duties but that this was not a concern as it 
was to be addressed through the longer term financial strategy.  As long as the use of 
supplementary and softer information remains as a complement to the hard performance 
indicator data, this may not become a significant problem in the future. 
The perspective of those people responsible for taking actions which influence long term 
outcomes will be influenced by the likelihood that they will still be in post when the 
outcomes are revealed.  For example, some of the Trust Chief Executives in our study had 
inherited a very poor financial or clinical situation from the previous post holder and it may 
be the case that some of the actions taken previously would not have been taken if the post 
holders had anticipated they would have been around to face the consequences. As one Chief 
Executive who had recently taken over a poorly performing Trust stated of his predecessor: 
 
  ''The last guy got out of here before it hit the fan. Timing is all''  
 
Longer employment contracts may encourage behaviour which takes account of the impact of 
current actions on future targets.  Alternatively, ensuring that at least some reliable and The NHS Performance Framework: Taking Account of Economic Behaviour 
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appropriate process measures are included in a performance management system would 
provide an early signal of whether behaviour was likely to produce the desired long term 




Misrepresentation is the deliberate manipulation of data so that reported behaviour differs 
from actual behaviour.  The scope for misrepresentation of data within a Trust environment is 
particularly broad because many of the data used to measure performance and hold staff to 
account are under the direct control of those staff.   A mixed picture emerged in our study, 
with some people citing specific instances of misrepresentation (either by them personally or 
by others), whilst others said they were confident this did not happen within their 
organisation.  Examples of creative measurement cited included: 
 
•  double counting of FCEs when a patient is referred to another consultant within the same 
hospital  
•  excluding the least favourable when calculating results e.g. not including out-patient 
clinics where a consultant was sick or was called to casualty so that the 30 minute waits 
are achieved   
•  changing the order in which the codes for procedures undertaken on patients are entered.  
For example, the pressure to achieve a low rate for D&Cs can encourage staff to enter the 
D&C as the second, rather than the primary procedure undertaken on a patient because 
only the first code is included in the returns.   
 
Some of this manipulation is undertaken because people are keen to give the impression they 
are meeting the targets and the degree of flexibility involved in recording and reporting the 
data makes this possible, without them having to resort to outright lies.   Most people said 
they felt they were "massaging" data rather than misrepresenting it and that all they were 
doing was presenting themselves in  the "best possible light".  There was some evidence that 
Health Authorities and Trusts sometimes collude in this, especially when the NHS Executive 
is taking a tough line with failures to meet targets.      
"... you look for ways that you can conspire with the Health Authority to give them 
what they want to hear up there.  In a way it minimises your pain and maximises their 
gain".  (Health Authority Finance Director) 
''Yes we definitely did that [collude with the local Trust to misrepresent efficiency 
index figures].  The only way that Health Authorities were gaining resources was to 
show that they were increasing care in areas that they were not.   But what we felt 
was that once you start fiddling the figures you have to keep a consistent message 
year on year and it gets further away from reality'' (Health Authority Finance 
Director) 
    
Thus there is an incentive to just ensure the information is reported in such a way as to give those 
on the ground a 'quiet life'.  Similarly, some  Health Authorities noted that although they were 
pleased that their local Trusts met the Patient's Charter standards, they could not help wondering 
whether this was an accurate reflection of what actually went on at ground level or whether the 
Trusts were skilled at ensuring the data were recorded in a way that gave the right results: 





"..... they are very good at demonstrating they are very good at meeting the Patient's 
Charter, but that doesn't mean they have met the spirit of what you are trying to 
achieve".  (Health Authority Finance Director) 
 
Paradoxically, because there has been a tendency to provide additional finance for those 
failing to meet the waiting times targets, there is also sometimes an incentive for Trusts to 
misrepresent their data in the opposite direction, extending their waiting times in order to 
obtain additional funds.   Some Trust Chief Executives noted that it was relatively easy to 
"extend" their waiting lists in order to provide a good argument for a share of extra funding 
(especially central funds).   
 
Although many examples of misrepresentation were supplied, others in our sample stated that 
even though they know they could distort the information, they chose not to, either as they 
felt it was dishonest or because they feared detection.  For example, one Medical Director 
said he had been approached by a casualty consultant about reducing the number of people 
who were sent home rather than admitted as - if they admitted them - the patients would 
count as extra FCEs, hence boosting their activity data.  The Medical Director declined on 
the grounds that this was poor clinical practice and that they would bound to be detected.  
Others felt it was wrong to cover up a problem by fiddling the figures as the root cause of the 
problem would then never be tackled.  In addition, many of the junior medical staff were not 
even aware of what the current measures are so they were certainly not in a position to 
undertake a great deal of data manipulation. 
 
Misrepresentation of data can also arise when those responsible for reporting do not place 
sufficient importance on it, because they feel the measures are not valid and are not therefore 
willing to devote effort to ensuring the data are valid.  A particular example of this was 
revealed in our interviews when a Medical Director admitted that he had "scandalised" his 
junior colleagues by suggesting that: 
 
  "..... we save ourselves 5 hours and make the figures up".   
 
In this case, the indicator for patients' complaints required the Trust to use a different 
classification system for the returns to the NHS Executive than the system they were using 
for returns to the purchaser.  The Medical Director felt justified in having a guess rather than 
going through a bureaucratic process as he did not feel they were doing it for gain (other than 
saving time). 
 
An additional aspect of data misrepresentation which does not involve the deliberate 
manipulation of data relates to the general quality of the data used to compile the measures.  
A number of respondents mentioned the "garbage in - garbage out" issue whereby they felt 
that although the measures may be acceptable in principle, in practice the data used to 
compile them were so poor and subject to so many errors or distortions, that they felt no 
confidence in the figures that come out at the end.  For example, in relation to the proposals 
for national reference cost schedules, a number of purchasers remarked that they had already 
tried cost benchmarking and had identified significant problems using it just on a local basis.  
One problem is caused by  the difficulties in ensuring the cost data used by Trusts are The NHS Performance Framework: Taking Account of Economic Behaviour 
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comparable and measure the same thing (even if it is done on a HRG basis and is supposed to 
follow central guidance on methodology), the results of the exercises raise more questions 
than answers.  In the words of one Health Authority Director of Finance,  
 
"there are clouds and clouds of smokescreens around the differences - you cannot just 
say, you [the Trust] are twice as expensive as the other".   
 
A similar point was made in relation to the waiting times data by another Health Authority 
and also in relation to the discrepancies in what is actually counted as a day case or an 
inpatient stay in some of the Trusts.  It was clear that without a lot of effort on the part of 
those monitoring the indicators, the results themselves are not very useful when the quality of 
the data used to produce them is questionable.   Many of the indicators proposed in the new 
framework will rely on data which are similarly subject to a degree of interpretation or are of 
variable quality.  
 
One possible way of reducing the extent of misrepresentation is to increase audit activity in 
order to detect it and to penalise those responsible.  However, the costs of any increased 
monitoring and audit would have to be weighed up against the benefits.   Providing 
incentives to record data honestly and consistently may also reduce misrepresentation, 
although it was clear from our study that it was not always obvious where the "blame" for 
this behaviour would rest.  For instance, although the doctors or nurses might record 
information truthfully, the data could be "massaged" further up the management line by those 
who gain from apparent good performance. Conversely, even if senior staff discourage 
misrepresentation, if those responsible for providing the data have no faith in the measures, 
the incentives may not be sufficient to motivate them to ensure the accuracy of the data is 
maintained.  The key is to find a balance by ensuring that those responsible for collecting, 
recording and reporting the data (which includes the most junior staff as well as the senior 







The most frequently cited example of gaming concerned the efficiency index.   Respondents 
indicated they would be reluctant to achieve high gains one year for fear that they would be 
expected to deliver the same or higher gains in the future. This ratchet effect was a common 
feature of the former Soviet economic system where managers were 'punished' for good 
performance by having higher standards set in the subsequent years plan.  Where this occurs 
managers have little incentive to increase productive efficiency and reduce organisational 
slack.  In our study, there was some acknowledgement that all parties knew that gaming went 
on and acted accordingly.  Frequently an analogy to participating in a  "game of chess" was 
made.  One Trust in the study which started out performing very well on the efficiency index 
tables, saw that there was little scope for matching these achievements in the following years 
so decided to reduce performance in certain areas so that they could get credit for improving 
performance at a later stage: 





  ''In the second and third year (of the efficiency index) we began to realise that simply 
working our staff harder and keeping the wage bill down was not necessarily the right 
way to go. So we then had a plan of sliding down the table and accepting that our 
position on the table would get worse-because everyone wants to get better and slide 
up the table” (Trust Medical Director)  
 
However, some Trusts pointed out that it had become easier over time to reach an agreement 
with the Health Authorities about the need to moderate future demand for efficiency gains if 
they had managed to achieve high gains in a particular year (especially if this was due to a 
specific service re-configuration which would not be repeated the following year). Some felt 
that the game playing wasted a lot of time and effort and that they preferred to avoid it if they 
could.  Although the efficiency index is due to be replaced, it is worth noting the problems 
above as they will relate to any system whereby the current performance target is based on 
past performance.  
 
The financial regime in which Trusts operate was also felt to encourage some gaming.  It was 
noted that Trusts which fail to meet their financial duties will often get "bailed out" by the 
region and thus there may be an incentive to fail to meet these targets - not in a spectacular 
way which would attract a great deal of attention, but sufficient to allow overspending 
without penalty.  One Trust used the example of a neighbouring Trust which had managed to 
get five star ratings on the Patient's Charter targets by overspending and will not be required 
to meet their deficits the following year.  Similarly, those who fail to meet waiting times 
targets are more likely to receive a share of the extra waiting list funds made available from 
central resources than those who have already achieved the targets. 
 
One strategy for minimising gaming is to use a range of performance measures rather than 
just one which may be easily gamed.  Although there are currently a range of indicators for 
the NHS, a great deal of emphasis has been placed on achievement of the efficiency target 
and as this is also sometimes linked to explicit rewards for senior staff, it is therefore not 
surprising that gaming has focused on this specific indicator.  Although the efficiency index 
is to disappear, it is important to ensure that the reward structure for meeting any targets is 
flexible enough to respond to managerial efforts which contribute towards improvements in 
future targets as well as the achievement of current targets.  Development of benchmarks of 
performance which are independent of the organisation's past behaviour can also help to 
minimise the gains from gaming.  Although comparative analysis of performance brings a 
different set of problems, if managers understand that their future targets will not be 
influenced to any great extent by current performance, they are more likely to seek out 
opportunities to improve their performance. 
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(VII)  SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In this paper we have outlined the importance of ensuring that attention is paid to the 
potential unintended and dysfunctional consequences induced by any system of performance 
measurement.  It is clear that performance measures do not always effect the desired changes 
in behaviour.  The unintended consequences of some measures may actually encourage 
people to behave in ways which are directly contradictory to what was expected.  Although 
respondents were referring to the current indicators which may be changed in the future, 
many will be similar to (or in some cases, the same as) existing indicators.  Moreover, there 
is no reason to expect substantially different behavioural responses even for completely new 
indicators. 
 
Techniques to mitigate some of the specific unintended consequences highlighted by 
respondents have been suggested and it is also possible to identify some general strategies 
which address the dysfunctional outcomes, as noted by Smith(1995).  The first four strategies 
address a large number of problems, and so are likely to be applicable in most situations: 
 
•  Involving staff at all levels in the development and implementation of performance 
measurement schemes; 
•  Retaining flexibility in the use of performance indicators, and not relying on them 
exclusively for control purposes; 
•  Seeking to quantify every objective, however elusive; 
•  Keeping the performance measurement system under constant review. 
 
The importance of the next three strategies is more dependent on the particular aspect of 
performance being measured, being most relevant when objectives are  
poorly defined and measurement of output problematic: 
 
•  Measuring client satisfaction; 
•  Seeking expert interpretation of the performance indicator scheme; 
•  Maintaining careful audit of the data. 
The final three strategies are designed to address specific difficulties - myopia, 
misinterpretation and gaming - and so should be considered when any of these is especially 
important.  Note however that they may have negative effects relevant to other dysfunctional 
phenomena as highlighted earlier. 
 
•  Nurturing long term career perspectives amongst staff; 
•  Keeping the number of indicators small; 
•  Developing performance benchmarks independent of past activity. 
 
The extent to which these and other potential solutions are relevant for the new National 
Performance Framework is a matter for further research and consideration. 
In conclusion, we advocate a cautious approach to the implementation of the National 
Performance Framework.   Current proposals represent an improvement over the previous 
methods of managing the NHS, but it would be a mistake to assume that only positive results 
will be produced.  We have illustrated the potential for unintended and dysfunctional side-effects 
in the NHS and we have suggested some strategies which may be used to help reduce the extent 






However, until more is known about the behavioural impact of performance management 
systems, there will always be a danger that new systems will perpetuate the tendencies towards 
dysfunctional behaviour and even create additional ones.  This suggests that the new National 
Framework should be evaluated not only in terms of the degree to which it produces the expected 
improvements in the chosen measures, but also in terms of the unanticipated side-effects.  A 
major research task is to identify the characteristics of schemes which influence successfully the 
behaviour of NHS staff.  This would involve consideration of the impact of alternative 
dissemination methods (eg league tables, target setting, benchmarking, informal review) as well 
as the incentives and sanctions associated with the indicators (eg financial, peer pressure, 
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